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June 2, 1967

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MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

DCI China Intelligence Activities Coordinator

SUBJECT : China Intelligence Activities

My answers to the questions in your memorandum of May 2, 1967 follow.

1. Probably the most critical intelligence need in the short run is information on Chinese Communist intentions toward and actions relating to the war in Vietnam, especially reports on troop movements. On a longer run basis a crucial need is for indications on policy views of individual leaders and the relative power of the leaders.

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2. The present priority is acceptable.

4. It is time for a general examination and evaluation of our economic analysis. The models and the methods now accepted should be reviewed and discussed within the intelligence community to assure they have not become too unrealistic. Intelligence requirements should also be reviewed to avoid the danger of seeking information that fits the existing models and of defending rather than testing the models. Economists within the intelligence community should try to ascertain just where China is today and thus establish a realistic base upon which to devise intelligence requirements and evaluate information. It would be valuable if analysts could be given more time for background reading and study in order better to set developments into perspective.

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Office of Research and Analysis
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